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The Right to Stay
PatrickM. McFadden*
ABSTRACT

People oftenfightfor their homes. Once established,homes
are vital centers of life, and their threatened loss generates
predictable resistance. This Article shows how the human
desire not to be moved is protected by the law. Such
protection can be found in both U.S. domestic and
international law, although the two systems of law vary
widely in their approach. Since World War Hf, international
scholars and lawmakers have been deeply concerned with
promoting the legal rights of people to leave and return to
their own countries. This Article emphasizes a different, but

equally Important right: the right of people, f they wish, to
stay exactly where they are.
This Article examines how states protect individuals who
wish to preserve an established home. First, the author
summarizes the approach of U.S. law. In particular, he
examines how property law and constitutional provisions
provide a continued right to possess property. Second, the
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author examines international legal protections,focusing on
the rules of war, the rights of indigenous peoples and aliens,
and relevant norms from International human rights
instruments. Finally, the Article compares the advantages
and disadvantagesof the internationaland U.S. approaches.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The desire to put down roots-to settle in and not be
moved-is evident everywhere, but probably clearest in the
countryside. In western Kansas, where this author grew up, men
and women take pride in having farmed the same ground for their
entire lives, the same ground farmed by their parents and
grandparents before them.
Each in turn has learned the
land-its precise topography and vegetation, its challenges, and
its possibilities of fruitfulness. From the land comes life and a
way of life, handed on from generation to generation. It is always
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a cause of sadness when a farm passes out of a family's hands,
for it is a defeat of sorts-a loss of stewardship and a severing of
longstanding ties. It is always a tragedy, mild or profound, when
a sale of the land has been forced.'
Things are different in the city, where home and work are
much more likely to be physically separated, where the housing
stock is more fungible, and where renting-with its implied
transience-is much more common. 2 As a consequence, it is
rarer for urban and suburban homes to remain in the same
family through several generations. But even urban dwellers hate
to move. Although the urban connection with living space is more
utilitarian, the home is nonetheless a center of life. Even the oneyear apartment dweller feels the effect. The great little record
shop is down the street and around the corner. Every morning
the woman at the dry-cleaner's waves hello. Friends live nearby.
A regular parking space has been secured. Even in the city,
moving is a cause for some regret and visits to an old
neighborhood predictably inspire nostalgic rumination. Forced
3
moves are particularly distressing.
In both its urban and rural manifestations, the desire to stay
where one is, and not to be moved, is deeply rooted in the human
psyche. Biologists connect it with a territoriality found in many

1.
The loss of farm ownership is a source of drama not missed by film
producers. See, e.g., COUNTRY (Buena Vista 1984); PLACES IN THE HEART (Tri-Star

1984); THE RIVER (Universal 1984).
2.
On residential patterns in urban areas, see MICHAEL J. DOucET & JOHN
WEAVER, HOUSING THE NORTH AMERICAN CITY 388-419 (1991) (detailing the
development of apartment housing); WILLIAM C. APGAR & HENRY 0. POLLAKOWSKI,
HOUSING MOBILITY AND CHOICE (1986); PETER S.K. CHI, U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT, POPULATION REDISTRIBUTION AND CHANGES IN HOUSING TENURE

STATUS IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (1980) (discussing. inter alia, transience of
renters); JOHN L. GOODMAN, URBAN RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY 13 (1978) (noting that
renters are about four times more likely than homeowners to move in any year);
CONSTANCE PERIN, EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE 32-80 (1977) (describing the social

meaning of the change from renting to home ownership).
3.
Professor Bell makes the point nicely:
The home not only provides the basic necessity of shelter but is also
central to an individual's emotional and personal life. The intangible
connection between [individuals] and [their homes] is not limited to
homeowners. For tenants as well an involuntary removal from the home
can be devastating, depriving the tenant of both physical and emotional
security.
Deborah Hodges Bell, Providing Security of Tenure for Residential Tenants: Good
Faith as a Limitation on the Landlord's Right to Terminate, 19 GA. L. REv. 483, 483
(1985).
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other animals. 4 Poets and other writers have long described it in5
tales of home: staying home, leaving home, and returning home.
With less beauty, but with a certain systematic precision, the
desire (or need) to stay has been charted and analyzed by
sociologists and psychologists. 6 Their findings are not surprising:
to move is to face change, often dramatic change-the tearing
away of old connections and relationships, the exchange of the
known for the unknown. Moving brings threats, stress, and
7
unhappiness.
It should not be surprising that a desire so strong and deep
as the desire to stay is reflected in the law. Indeed, once one
begins to think in terms of a right to stay, one begins to see it
everywhere, in both domestic and international practice. There
are, however, some curiosities in the translation from human
desire to legal right.
First, the underlying normative
principle-founded in biology, sociology, psychology, and
history-seems both simple and clear: people ought not to be
moved against their will. And yet the law is not explicitly
organized around this principle and its possible exceptions.
Instead, the right to stay is founded on a series of disparate
provisions, which collectively, though inelegantly, secure the
right. The second curiosity is that the U.S. domestic provisions
securing a right to stay are radically different from the

4.
See, e.g., ROBERT ARDREY, THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE (1966); JONATHAN
L. FREEDMAN, CROWDING AND BEHAVIOR 32 (1975) ("[Mlany animals probably have

[territorial instincts] under conditions involving limited food supply or protection
of the nest or family... ."). Cf. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *4 ("In the
case of habitations in particular, it was natural to observe, that even the brute
creation to whom every thing else was in common, maintained a kind of
permanent property in their dwellings. . . . Hence a property was soon
established in every man's house and home stall.").
5.
The Bible is an extraordinarily rich source for such stories, the
earliest, most dramatic ones involving the expulsion of Adam and Eve from the
Garden of Eden, Genesis 3. and the exodus of the Jews from Egypt, Exodus 1114. In ancient Greek literature. Homer's Odyssey tells the story of Odysseus's
return home from the Trojan wars. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY (Walter Shewring trans.,
1980). In twentieth century U.S. literature, one of the greatest stories of home is
told in JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH (1939).
6.
See. e.g., Marcia S. Hausman & James R. Reed, PsychologicalIssues In
Relocation: Response to Change, 17 J. CAREER DEv. 247 (Summer 1991)
(discussing relocation as crisis event with associated feelings of anger, loss, and
low self-esteem); Thayer Scudder & Elizabeth Colson, From Wefare to
Development. A Conceptual Frameworkfor the Analysts of Dislocated People, In
INVOLUNTARY MIGRATION AND RESETTLEMENT:
THE PROBLEMS AND RESPONSES OF
DISLOCATED PEOPLE 269-71 (Art Hansen & Anthony Oliver-Smith eds., 1982)
(describing the physiological, psychological, and soclo-cultural stress of moving);
John CIaydon. Internationally Uprooted People and the TransnationalProtection of
Minority Culture, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 125, 130-34 (1978) (surveying the
cultural deprivations experienced by those forced to leave their homelands).
7.
See supra note 6.
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international provisions, even though both sets of provisions
respond to the same human need.

This Article has two purposes. First, it seeks to demonstrate
that the law, both domestic and international, does indeed secure
a "right to stay," even though the term itself, or one like it, is

seldom used. 8

Second, the Article explores the differences

between the U.S. and international approaches in securing that
Part II describes the U.S. approach and Part III the
right.
international. Part IV summarizes the differences, discusses the
advantages and disadvantages of each approach, and suggests
some directions in which each system could profitably move.
The right to stay is more than an academic curiosity. Every
year, for all sorts of reasons, hundreds of thousands of people,
9
For
perhaps millions, are forced to move from their homes.
often
and
desired
those involved, these movements are seldom
tragic.' 0 National interests are threatened, too, as nations work
to accommodate, often with declining enthusiasm, the resulting
In recent
inflows of persons moving from somewhere else."
One author recently argued that a "right not to be displaced" ought to
8.
be recognized as an international human right. Maria Stavropoulou, The Right
Not to Be Displaced, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 689, 741-48 (1994). Such a right,
however, is not incorporated in any human rights treaty, and the author's
argument that such a right is needed is not entirely convincing. See id. at 748
("[Clertain human rights are likely to be violated whenever displacement occurs.").
Still, the article provides a useful collection of international legal rules that are
implicated in the forced movement of persons. Id. at 717-35. See also Alfred de
Zayas, The Right to the Homeland, Ethnic Cleansing and the International
Criminal Tribunal 31 (Mar. 9, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(calling for reaffirmation of "the right of the homeland").
U.S. law, on the other hand, seems never to have been analyzed for its
protections of a "right to stay," though certain aspects of that protection have

often been collected and analyzed. On the protection of mortgage debtors, see,
e.g., MICHAEL T. MADISON & ROBERT M. ZINMAN, MODERN REAL ESTATE FINANCING
285-90, 1016-34 (1991).
See. e.g.. Robin Wright, World View; Millions Adrift in Their Own Lands.
9.
L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 8, 1994, World Report, at 1 (surveying plight of millions of
internally displaced persons); Jacques Quenod's Report on Refugees, Displaced
Persons and Returnees. U.N. ESCOR, 2d Sess., 37th plen. mtg. 10, U.N. Doc.
E/1991/109/Add.1 (1991) (estimating then current number of border-crossing
refugees at 17 million, and internally displaced persons at 24 million) [hereinafter
Quenod Report]. See also Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization,
Human Rights Dimensions of Population Transfer, Conference Held in Tallin,
Estonia, January 1992 (David Goldberg, rapporteur, 1992) (considering forced
transfers from around the world).
See, e.g., Nancy Mallin, Uprooted People, COMPANY, Summer 1992, at 210.
5 (describing "Refugee Voices," a program publicizing the plight of refugees by
broadcasting their stories told in their own words).
David A. Martin, The New Asylum Seekers, in THE NEW ASYLUM SEEKERS
11.
1 (David A. Martin ed., 1986) (detailing history of post-World War II refugee flows
and responses); Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on International

6
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years, a great deal of necessary and helpful attention has been
given to the question of how to handle the victims of forced
movement after they have taken flight. The result has been 13a
12
and internally displaced persons.
burgeoning law of refugees

But it is also clearly time to address the prior question:
14
keep people from being moved in the first place.

how to

II. THE U.S. APPROACH
In the United States, the right to stay is secured primarily
through property law.
Owners of estates in land, both
homeowners and tenants, have the right to possess their property
and to exclude others, including those who would seek to move
the owners somewhere else. So long as ownership of the estate
subsists, a continued right to possession is guaranteed. 5
Freehold estates (today, fee simple and life estates) can be lost in
only a limited number of ways (e.g., in a forced sale to pay the
owner's debts, in an eminent domain proceeding, or in a statutory

Cooperation to Avert New Refugee Flows, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Prel. List Item
78,
38-40, U.N. Doe. A/41/324 (1986) (describing international burdens
created by coercive population movements). The United States is a frequent
destination for migrants, both voluntary and involuntary. See Jeffrey S. Passel &
Michael Fix, U.S. Immigration In a Global Context- Past,Present& Future, 2 IND. J.
GLOBAL L. STUD. 5, 6 (1994) (noting that 2% of world's population lives outside
country of birth. 22 million of whom are living in the United States).
12.
See. generally, THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE CRISIS: BRITISH AND
CANADIAN RESPONSES (Vaughan Robinson ed., 1993); LAwYERS COMMITTEE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS:
PROTECTIONS AFFORDED REFUGEES, ASYLUM SEEKERS AND DISPLACED PERSONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS. HUMANITARIAN AND REFUGEE LAW (1991) [hereinafter
LAWYERS COMMITTEE]; REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY. INTERNATIONAL AND UNITED STATES

RESPONSES (Ved P. Nanda ed., 1989); RICHARD PLENDER, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
LAW 393-458 (2d rev. ed. 1988); THE NEVASYLUM SEEKERS, supra note 11.
13.
See, e.g.. FRANCIS M. DENG, PROTECTING THE DISPOSSESSED 1-20, 133-40
(1993); Richard Plender. The Legal Basis of InternationalJurisdiction to Act with
Regard to the Internally Displaced, 6 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 345 (1994); Corrine E.
Lewis, Dealing with the Problem of Internally Displaced Persons, 6 GEO. IMMIOR.
L.J. 693 (1992); Ved P. Nanda. InternationalLaw and the Refugee Challenge: Mass
Expulsion and Internally DisplacedPersons, 28 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 791 (1992).
14.
The right to stay is also to be distinguished from the related rights to
leave and return to one's homeland, about which there is a growing body of
literature and continued interest. See, e.g., ALAN DowTY, CLOSED BORDERS: THE
CONTEMPORARY ASSAULT ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT (1987); HURST HANNUM, THE
RIGHT TO LEAVE AND RETURN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE

(1987); Stig

Jagerskiold. The Freedom of Movement, In THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 166
(Louis Henkin ed., 1981); Rosalyn Higgins, The Right In International Law of an
Individual to Enter,Stay In and Leave a Country, 49 INT'L AFF. 341 (1973).
15.
ROGERA. CUNNINGHAM ETAL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY26 (2d ed. 1993).
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Nonfreehold estates (leaseholds) can be lost in
forfeiture). 16
similar ways, but are more commonly lost for nonpayment of rent
and breaches of other tenant covenants. 17 The right to stay is
protected not only by limiting the modes of loss, but also by
hedging them in with substantive and procedural requirements
that limit their actual occurrence.
A. Limiting First-OrderCauses of Loss

1. Debt
Homes can be lost on account of debt, but not easily. There
is a longstanding tradition in U.S. law that protects real estate,
particularly residences, from forced sale by creditors. This is a
significant concession in a commercial society, where economic
health depends on the continued availability of credit, and thus
on the timely repayment of debt. In such a society, every barrier
to the forced sale of residential real estate constitutes a tribute to
the right to stay and a willingness to risk economic harm for the
purpose of giving homeowners every possible chance to stay
where they are.
General creditors who lack a secured interest in a debtor's
home confront two major hurdles in forcing the sale of a personal
residence. First, such creditors must reduce their debt to a court
judgment.' 8 Second, they must initiate a procedure of court-

16.
Each of these causes of loss will be discussed Infra. Freehold estates
can also be lost by adverse possession, but adverse possession claims are not
particularly relevant to the present discussion. If an owner is in possession of his

or her residence, there is hardly any chance of there being an adverse possessor
in the same residence, much less an adverse possessor who has been around
long enough to establish an ownership claim. On adverse possession generally,
see td. at 807-15; JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW

OF PROPERTY 333-39 (3d ed. 1989). Freehold estates can also be lost, like any
item of property, through mistake, fraud, double-dealing, or other sorts of

chicanery, at least when innocent third parties and recording acts are involved.
See, e.g., Mortensen v. Lingo, 99 F. Supp. 585 (D. Alaska 1951) (holding that the
first grantee lost to the second grantee (from a common grantor) because the first
deed was improperly indexed in the records); Patterson v. Bryant, 5 S.E.2d 849

(N.C. 1939) (holding that the first grantee lost to the second grantee (from a
common grantor) because the second grantee recorded first); Strong v. Whybark,
102 S.W. 968 (Mo. 1907) (holding that the first grantee lost to the second grantee
(from a common grantor) because the second grantee recorded first).
See infra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
17.
18.
See DAVID G. EPSTEIN & STEvE H. NICKLES, DEBT 5-6 (1994); ELIZABETH
WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 51-52 (2d ed.

1991).
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sponsored levy and sale, 19 a procedure that specially protects the

debtor's home. The primary form of this protection is the
homestead exemption, which typically exempts a debtor's home
(or a maximum dollar value thereof) from levy and sale by general
creditors. 20 In addition, many states have established a general
statutory preference that a debtor's personal property be levied

upon first. The debtor's home, an item of real property, is thus

21
saved from levy and sale unless other assets are insufficient.
Even secured creditors, who hold a lien on the very home at
issue, face serious challenges when they attempt to force a sale.
Contractors, suppliers, and other holders of statutory liens must
comply strictly with the statutory procedures relevant to their
particular liens.
Compliance is sometimes complicated and
always time-sensitive, both to establish the lien initially and to
enforce it later. 2 2
Holders of contractually generated liens,
primarily mortgage lenders, have the nominal option of devising
quicker, easier procedures for the sale of a delinquent debtor's
home, but even they find forced sales difficult.2 3
Mortgage
debtors are often protected by a number of judicial and legislative
mandates, including carefully monitored duties of good faith and
due diligence on the part of the lenders;2 4 obligatory opportunities

19.
EPSTEIN & NiICLES, supra note 18, at 6-12; WARREN & WESTBROOK,
supra note 18, at 52-53.
20.
See generally THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 21.03 (David A. Thomas
ed. 1994); 1 AMERiCAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 5.75-5.120 (1952); Joseph McKnight,
Protection of the Family Homefrom Seizure by Creditors: The Sources and Evolution
of a Legal Principle. 86 S.W. HIST. L.Q. 364 (1983). Homestead protection is not
complete: (1) only debtors with "families" are entitled to protection; (2) the dollar
amount of protection is often low; and (3) there is typically no protection against
several kinds of debts (tax liens, purchase money liens, and mechanics' and
suppliers' liens). But for all that, the homestead exemption represents a clear
acknowledgment that the home is to be treated differently in the debt-collection
process.
21.
EPSTEIN & NICKLES, supra note 18, at 7.
22.
See generally Michael G. Walsh, A Mechanics' Lien Primer for the
General Practitioner,37 PRAC. LAW. 77, 86-88 (1991); Daniel R. Frost, Mechanics'
Liens, in REAL PROPERTY PRACTICE AND LITIGATION 592, 602-03 (Beverly J. Quail ed.,
1990).
23.
MADISON & ZINMAN, supra note 8, at 1024 ("[Slome states have so
encumbered the [foreclosure] process with borrower protections as to make
foreclosure a very time-consuming and expensive proposition.").
24.
See, e.g., Williams v. Resolution GGF OY, 630 N.E.2d 581, 584 (Mass.
1994) (The mortgagee "must act in good faith and must use reasonable diligence
to protect the interests of the mortgagor."); Murphy v. Financial Dev. Corp., 495
A.2d 1245 (N.H. 1985) (Mortgage lenders did not violate duty of good faith, but
did fail to exercise due diligence in obtaining a fair price at the foreclosure sale.).
See also UNI. LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 3-508(a) (noting that all aspects of the
foreclosure sale must be "reasonable"); David H. Fishman, The ForeclosureSale, in
3 THE ACREL PAPERS 47, 55-56 (1992) (listing over 20 grounds upon which a
foreclosure sale can be overturned).
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for the debtor to cure defaults by making late payments to the
lender; 2 5 and a right of the debtor to repurchase
the property
26
from the winning bidder at the foreclosure sale.
Governments, as creditors, fare little better than their private
counterparts. The nonpayment of property taxes, for example,
typically triggers special procedures under which the relevant
state or local government can force the sale of the taxed
property. 27 Law and practice vary a great deal among states, 2 8
but, on the whole, such procedures are notoriously protective of
the property tax debtor. Typically the property tax liability must
have remained unpaid for a substantial period of time before a tax
sale is ordered. When such a sale is ordered, the debtor can
bring the proceedings to a halt by paying the taxes (with interest
and penalties) at any time before the sale. Even after the sale, the
debtor is given a significant period of time to redeem the
property. 29 The entire process, from the initial imposition of
property tax liability to the delivery of a deed to a new owner,
usually involves several different steps by several different actors.
The complexity of the process serves to protect the tax debtor,
since courts are prone to overturn tax sales for a formal deficiency

25.
GEORGE LEFCOE, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 469 (1993); Robert M.
Washburn, The Judicial and Legislative Response to Price Inadequacy in Mortgage

ForeclosureSales, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 843, 929-30 (1980) (statutorily required time

periods betveen default and foreclosure).
26.

LEFCOE, supra note 25, at 470; GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN,

REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 8.4-8.8 (3d ed. 1993); MADISON & ZINMAN, supra note
8, at 1027-28. For a recent, national survey of foreclosure law, see FORECLOSURE
LAW AND RELATED REMEDIES: A STATE-BY-STATE DIGEST (Sidney A. Keyles ed., 1995).
27.
See, e.g., Ellen F. Friedman, Note, The Constitutionality of Request
Notice Provisions in In Rem Tax Foreclosures, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 1209, 1211-17
(1988) (national summary of property tax statutes, procedures, and importance).

28.

RAYMOND J. WERNER & ROBERT KRATOVIL, REAL ESTATE LAW 654 (10th

ed.

1992) ("ILlaws regarding levy, assessment, and collection of the [property] tax vary
considerably, so that few general statements can be made that will be universally

true.").
29.
For the Illinois system, see, e.g., 35 ILCS 200/21-5 (tax sales and
related procedures for collecting delinquent property taxes); Rosewell v. Chicago
Title & Trust Co., 459 N.E.2d 966 (Ill. 1984) (summarizing the tax sale and tax
deed system in Illinois); Guerino Turano, Redemption from Tax Sales in
Illnots-Confusion Galore, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 107 (1989) (survey of Illinois
redemption law and practice).
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at any step,3 0 and to examine carefully whether the due process
3
rights of all interested parties are vindicated. '
2. Governmental Takings: Eminent Domain and Forfeiture
Homeowners, both freeholders and leaseholders, can also lose
their estates by government condemnation, but this authority,
too, is highly circumscribed. A legally defensible taking requires a
legitimate public purpose,3 2 the payment of just compensation, 33
and a fair process throughout. 3 4
These requirements make
takings a lengthy and expensive proposition, helping to assure, as
a practical matter, that public authorities are circumspect in their
35
exercise of the power.
Homeowners can also suffer a civil or criminal forfeiture of
their estate, and thus be forced to move, if they commit certain
offenses on the premises.3 6 The forfeiture of real property as a
penalty for criminal acts has a venerable history in AngloAmerican law, reaching back at least as far as thirteenth-century
England.3 7 The practice had fallen out of fashion in the United

30.
E.g., Wallace v. President Street, L.P., 430 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. 1993) (Tax
sale purchaser's quiet title action failed because redemption foreclosure notice
was timed improperly.); see WERNER & KRATOVIL, supra note 28, at 659 ("A] tax
title acquired through normal tax sale usually constitutes the flimsiest sort of
title, since deviation from the technical requirements of the law will invalidate the

title.").
31.
See, e.g., Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983)
(holding that publication notice in a tax sale Insufficient under due process
clause); Michael H. Rubin & E. Keith Carter, Notice of Seizure In Mortgage
Foreclosures and Tax Sale Proceedings: The Ramffications of Mennonite. 48 LA. L.
REv. 535 (1988) (describing the effect of Mennonite on Louisiana tax sale practice
and procedure); Carla W. Tanner, Note, Forfeited and DelinquentLands: Resolving
the Due ProcessDeficiencies. 96 W. VA. L. REV. 251, 253-55 (1993) (detailing due
process concerns under West Virginia law and practice).
32.
See, e.g., THE AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 17.01[b] & 17.03
(Arthur R. Guadio et al. eds.. 1994); Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska ex rel. Bd.
of Transp., 164 U.S. 403 (1896).
33.
See, e.g., THE AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, supra note 32, 9§
17.01[c] & 17.04; Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
34.
See RICHARD A. POSNER. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 58 (4th ed. 1992)
(Compensation obligation prevents the government from overusing the taking
power.).
35.
See U.S. CONsT. amend. V. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).

36.
See, e.g.. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988 & Supp. 1993) (civil forfeiture of
real property used in illegal drug transaction); id. § 853 (criminal forfeiture of
property by a person convicted of an illegal drug activity); 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988)
(RICO forfeiture of property used in drug dealing).
37.
1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 351-52, 466 (1968). See also Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some
Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and Western
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States in the late twentieth century, until it was revived in 1984,

when Congress added real property to the list of assets subject to

forfeiture under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970.38 The increased use of forfeiture by federal
authorities to combat the drug trade is both fascinating and
alarming. 3 9
But, whatever their current wisdom or future
prospects, these sorts of forfeitures, like other governmental and
private takings, are circumscribed by substantive and procedural
40
rules that limit their actual occurrence.

3. Breaches of Lease Covenants
Leaseholders, unlike freeholders, also risk the loss of their

homes for failing to pay their rent on time or for breaching other
covenants contained in their leases. These additional sources of
loss are indeed significant, but they too are circumscribed. It was
an early tribute to the right to stay-and is still true today-that
breaches of rent and other tenant covenants do not give the
landlord an automatic right to terminate the tenant's possession.
The right to dispossess the tenant arises only from explicit
41
language in the lease or from a special statute.
The right to stay took a serious beating in the nineteenth
century when state legislatures began to enact summary eviction
statutes, creating quick, streamlined procedures under which

42
landlords could remove tenants for the nonpayment of rent.

Since their introduction, however, these statutes have undergone
an inexorable series of tenant-friendly changes (often by judicial

Notions of Sovereignty. 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169

(1973);

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES *289-90; James R. Maxeiner, Comment, Bane of American
ForfeitureLaw-Banshed atLast?, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 768 (1977.
38.
Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§
801-971 (1988)). In 1984, real estate was added to the list of property interests
subject to forfeiture found at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a). Forfeitures of personal property
have been more common in this century. See Susan J. Parcels, Note, An Analysis
of FederalDrug-RelatedCivil Forfeiture,34 ME. L. REv. 435, 435-37 (1982).
39.
See, e.g., Damon G. Saltzburg, Note, Real Property Forfeltures as a
Weapon In the Government's War on Drugs:A Failureto ProtectInnocent Ownership
Rights, 72 B.U. L. REV. 217 (1992); Sean D. Smith, Comment, The Scope of Real

Property Foifelturefor Drug-Related Crimes Under the Comprehensive Forfeiture
Act, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 303 (1988).
40.
See, e.g. 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(b)-(j) (1988 & Supp. 1993) (statutory
requirements, substantive and procedural); United States v. James Daniel Good
Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993) (noting that a pre-deprivation hearing is
generally required by the Constitution).
41.
See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 15, at 398.
42.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 12.1 statutory note at 399405, § 14.1 statutory note at 3-11 (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY].
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decision), which slow the proceedings and make them otherwise
43
less attractive to landlords.
The continuing vitality of the right to stay is also
demonstrated by the slow strangulation of the landlord's right to
"self-help" evictions. Lock-outs, furniture removals, temporary
entries, and other actions aimed at removing unwanted tenants,
without recourse to the courts, were once acceptable so long as
the landlord was truly entitled to possession of the premises and
used no more force than was necessary. 4 4 Most states now
permit self-help evictions only if peaceable, and a growing number
45
of jurisdictions prohibit them entirely.
The "landlord-tenant revolution" of the past thirty years has
greatly expanded tenants' rights to stay where they are. 4 6 In
prerevolutionary days, for example, a landlord could refuse to
renew an expired term of years or, with proper notice, could
terminate a periodic tenancy or tenancy at will for any reason or
for no reason at all. 4 7 Today, certain reasons for terminating
tenancies have been prohibited in every jurisdiction. Tenants
can, for example, resist terminations prompted by racial or gender
bias 48 or in retaliation for their complaints to local officials about
the condition of the demised premises. 49 Some jurisdictions go
even further, requiring landlords to have a good reason before
5°
they can terminate a tenancy.
Those parts of the landlord-tenant revolution aimed at
improving the quality of the demised premises also have
important ramifications for the right to stay.
Imposing on

43.

JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER. PROPERTY 499 (3d ed., 1995).

44.

Id. at 496.

45.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 14.2 reporter's note at 16
(self-help prohibited unless preserved by local law); ROBERT SCHOSHINSKI,
AMERIcAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT 407-08 (1980) (modem trend away from

self-help).
46.
See Bell, supra note 3, at 491-501 (recent doctrinal developments that
increase tenants' security of tenure); Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in
Residential Landlord-TenantLaw: Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV.
517, 520. 533-38 (1984) (recent doctrinal developments that increase tenants'
security of tenure).
47.
DUKEMINIER & KRIER. supra note 43, at 425-27.
48.
See, e.g., Bell. supra note 3, at 493 (state and federal limitations on
lease terminations and nonrenewals on account of race, sex, and other grounds);
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1988) (Fair Housing Act prohibition against denying a
dwelling to a person on account, inter alia, of race or sex).
49.
See, e.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969) (defense against retaliatory eviction recognized);
Bell, supra note 3. at 494-501 (reviewing judicial and statutory development of
retaliatory eviction doctrine); UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT § 5. 10 1,
7B U.L.A. 503 (1972) (prohibition of retaliatory eviction); MODEL RESIDENTIAL
LANDLORD TENANT CODE § 2-407 (1969) (prohibition of retaliatory eviction).
50.
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West 1987).
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5
landlords an obligation to keep their premises habitable '
eliminates a whole class of reasons to move. In theory, a tenant

no longer needs to change apartments in order to have a working

toilet. 5 2
In addition, a breach of the implied warranty of
habitability can serve as a defense in a landlord's summary action
53
for possession.
B. The Right to Stay, Expanded and Secured

1. Expansion Through Licenses
Once a right to stay is secured by the ownership of an estate,
the law of licenses permits the extension of that right to all whom
the title-holder chooses. 54 Although subject to revocation by the
title-holding licensor, the licensee's right to stay is good against
all third parties. For example, if A owns a house and agrees to let
B live there, no one else can dispossess B without incurring
55
liability to both B and A.
The right to stay is further secured by the law's restrictions
on the licensor's otherwise unfettered power of revocation.
Licenses coupled with an interest and those subject to estoppel
cannot be revoked. 5 6 In addition, licenses among family members
are subject to family law obligations of support. Licenses to one's

spouse and children are not entirely at the licensor's will, either

in the granting or revoking. For example, if a wife owns a house,
her obligation of marital support presumptively requires that her
husband be permitted to live there too, and she cannot ask him to

See Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, Modern Status of Rules as to the
51.
Existence of Implied Warranty of Habitability or Fitnessfor Use of Leased Premises,
40 A.L.R. 3d 646 (1971) (collecting judicial cases that invoke such an obligation in
the absence of statutes); Jane E. Bockus. Comment, Retaliatory Eviction in
Texas-An Analysis and a Proposal, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 303, 309 n.56 (1978)
(collecting statutes).
52.
See. e.g., Glasoe v. Trinkle, 479 N.E.2d 915 (InI. 1985) (overflowing
toilet, along with other deficiencies, constituted breach of implied warranty of
habitability); Hilder v. St. Peter, 144 Vt. 150, 478 A.2d 202 (1984) (overflowing
toilet, along with other deficiencies, constituted breach of implied warranty of
habitability).
53.
CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 15, at 401.
54.
3 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 64.02 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994).
For a discussion of licenses in land under common law, see Alfred F. Conard, An
Analysis of Licenses In Land, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1942).
55.
Conard, supra note 54, at 814.
56.
See Charles E. Clark, Licenses In Real Property Law, 21 COLUM. L. REv.
757, 767-82 (1921).
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leave for just any reason at all. 5 7 Minor children have an even
8
stronger claim not to be moved from their parents' homes.5
2. Added Security: Removing Second-Order Causes of Loss
License-driven extensions of the right to stay depend entirely
on the existence of an underlying property right. If licensors, as
sole title-holders, lose their possessory interests in their homes,
licensees lose their interests as well. For example, if parents lose
the family home in a foreclosure sale, their children must move
out with them. This suggests that further manifestations of a
legal right to stay can be found in laws that limit or ameliorate
the underlying conditions that threaten property holders,
including leaseholders, with the loss of their possessory rights.
People frequently lose title for financial reasons such as
failure to pay the landlord, the bank, the county tax collector, or

other creditors.

Legislatures are thus particularly attentive to

those situations in which rents or home-related debts can rise

precipitously and unexpectedly, situations that are most likely to
threaten the loss of one's home. By minimizing those situations,
the right to stay is strengthened. This is the common theme

running through rent control ordinances,5 9 emergency rent

assistance,6 0 caps on property taxes, 61 restrictions on variable-

rate mortgages, 6 2 and condominium-conversion legislation.6 3 All

tend to keep owners and renters where they are.

57.
See, e.g., HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS INTHE
UNITED STATES §§ 7.1, 7.3 (2d ed. 1987) (spousal obligations of support); Blanche
Crozier, Marital Support. 15 B.U. L. Rv. 28, 33 (1935) (Wife's right of support, at a
minimum, includes privilege of living with husband.). But see Joan M. Krauskopf
& Rhonda C. Thomas, PartnershipMarriage: The Solution to an Ineffective and
Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 558, 563-67 (1974) (courts generally
unwilling to give cause of action to wife for Inadequate support during marriage).
58.
Parents are limited in their ability to expel minor children because of
the parental obligation of support. See, e.g., Robert M. Horowitz, Economic
Interests of Children. In LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 10, 12-18, 22-23 (Robert M.
Horowitz & Howard A. Davidson eds., 1984) [hereinafter Legal Rights of Children].
In order to remove children from the parental home, the state must show abuse
or similar maltreatment. Id. at 262-312.
59.
See CUNNINGHAM ETAL., supra note 15, at 371.
60.
See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 350-J (3) (McKinney 1992).
61.
California's Proposition 13, passed in 1978, Is one of the most famous
efforts in this regard. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, §§ 1-6.
62.
See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501(4) (McKinney 1989); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 41 § 301 (1995); see also Christopher Caswell, Comment, The New
Mortgages:A FunctionalLegal Analysts, 10 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 95 (1982).
63.
See, e.g., WARREN FREEDMAN & JONATHAN B. ALTER. THE LAW OF
CONDOMINIA AND PROPERTY OWNERS' ASSOCIATIONS 26-28 (1992) (problems and
responses to condominium conversion); see also David A. Fine, Comment, The
Condominium Conversion Problemv Causes and Solutions, 1980 DUKE L. J. 306;
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3. Added Security: The Law Outside of Property
Although a right to stay is secured primarily through
property law, other laws sustain the right as well. Individuals are

secured against forced relocations by tort actions for trespass (the
tort law response to the property law violation), as well as assault,
and by criminal laws
battery, and false imprisonment,6
prohibiting assault, battery, burglary, and kidnapping. 65 Entries
by government officials are constrained by the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
66
seizures.
The most dramatic of forced movements, the punishment of
exile, has been described as "a penalty thus far unknown to our

law and at most but doubtfully within Congress' power. '6 7 In
addition, the law has slowly destroyed or modified all those
statutes that gave one person the right to determine where
another should live. Long gone are slavery, indentured servitude,
and a marriage relation that permitted husbands to determine
where their wives should live.6 8 Today, in private relations, only
minor children are left at the residential mercy of others, and
even they are realizing a marginal growth in their ability to decide
69
where they will live.

Note. The Validity of Ordinances Limiting Condominium Conversion, 78 MICH. L.
REv. 124 (1979).
64.
See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 13 (5th ed. 1984) (trespass to land); Id. § 10 (assault); id. § 9 (battery); Id.
§ 11 (false imprisonment).
65.
See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 7.16
(2d ed. 1986) (assault); id. § 7.15 (battery); Id. § 8.13 (burglary); ROLLIN M. PERKINS
& RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 229-34 (3d ed. 1982) (kidnapping).
66.
See, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); Colonnade
Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
67.
Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 616-17 (1949) (Rutledge, J.,
concurring). See also Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 791 (1988) (Stevens,
J., concurring in judgment) (Denaturalization, a punishment tantamount to exile
and banishment, is a "patently excessive" penalty for false statements made
during naturalization proceedings.); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 252-53
n.1 (1983) ("[C]ompelling a person 'to quit a city, place or country, for a specified
period of time, or for life,' has long been considered a unique and severe
deprivation, and was specifically outlawed [in England].") (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(quoting United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 269-70 (1905) (Brewer, J.,
dissenting)).
68.
On the ancient English rights of husbands, see 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND,

supra note 37, at 405-07, 414-20.
69.
See, e.g., Howard A. Davidson & Katherine Gerlach, Child Custody
Disputes: The Child's Perspective, in LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 58, at
243-48.
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C. PropertyLaw and the Right to Stay
United States law secures a right to stay primarily through
the law of property, with secondary support from family, tort,
criminal, and constitutional law. But property law dominates,
and securing a right to stay through property law has several
important consequences.
First, the method requires that the
right to stay be acquired. "If you wish to secure for yourself a
right not to be moved," says the law, "get yourself an estate in
land.
The longer the better."
Affirmative acquisitions are
required, whether by purchase, gift, devise, or descent.
Consequently, the poor are more likely to have shorter estates or
no estates at all. If the right to stay is truly fundamental, It is
curious that it is not guaranteed to everyone on roughly the same
terms.
Second, a property-based right to stay is highly vulnerable to
commercial loss. "Once you acquire an estate in land," the law
continues, "you cannot be moved for the length of that estate, so
long as you keep your creditors happy: pay your rent, pay your
mortgage, pay your taxes, indeed, pay all your debts with
sufficient timeliness so that no creditor is roused to move against
you." Once acquired, the right to stay lasts only so long as one
pays one's debts. The result could hardly be different in a system
tied to property. After all, property is an item of commerce. We
buy and sell it, lend and borrow against it, and invest and
speculate with it. Yet, it is curious that the right to stay, if truly
fundamental, should be so vulnerable to commercial loss.
Grounding a right to stay in property law produces results
that cut against the right's universality and security, but it also
has advantages. A property-based right to stay has a welcome
brittleness; it is easily violated and thus vigorously protects the
human interest in not being moved. It is good against all levels
and all branches of government; against all corporations,
partnerships, and other juristic persons; and against all.
individuals-bosses, siblings, spouses, children, friends, bullies,
and thieves. Furthermore, the property-based right to stay is
violated regardless of whether the right-holder is forced to move
across the hall, down the street, or beyond the national borders.

The right is violated regardless of whether the dispossession is
permanent or lasts for only a few minutes. The advantage of this
brittleness becomes especially apparent when contrasted with
international law's protection of the right to stay.
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III. THE INTERNATIONAL APPROACH

International law protects the right to stay, but in very

different ways from those found in U.S. law. The similarity of
ultimate results confirms the right to stay's universal and deeply
felt significance; the divergent means of attaining those results
reflect differing historical obsessions and modes of development
International law,
that characterize the two legal systems.
especially treaty law, moves along three broad lines of
development. New law-making efforts tend to focus either on: (1)
particular types of urgent situations (war, hijacking, ozonedepletion), (2) particular classes of persons thought to warrant
special attention and protection (migrants, ethnic minorities,
children), or (3) Individuals, in the development of international
human rights. The human interest in resisting forced movement
is reflected in all three lines of development. Manifestations of a
right to stay, for example, can be found in "situational" treaties on
70 genocide, 7 1 apartheid, 7 2
war and other armed conflicts,
73
economic development, and the environment. 7 4 Aspects of the

70.
See, e.g., Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, Annex, art. 46, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 ("[P]rivate property... must
be respected land] cannot be confiscated.") [hereinafter Hague Regulations];
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 3(13(b), 49, 53, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 290, 318, 322 (no hostagetaking; limits on forced movements; no destruction of real property) [hereinafter
Geneva Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I, June 8. 1977, arts. 51, 52, 85(4)(a), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,
26, 27, 42, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (protection of civilian population and objects;
population transfers characterized as "grave breaches") [hereinafter Protocol I];
Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II), June 8, 1977, art. 17, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 16 I.L.M. 1442 (prohibition
of forced movement of civilians) [hereinafter Protocol II].
See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
71.

of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, arts. II(c) & (e), 78 U.N.T.S. 277 ("Genocide" Is defined
as including the imposition of conditions of life calculated to bring about a
group's physical destruction and the forcible transfer of children from one group
to another.).
See, e.g., International Convention on the Suppression and
72.
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, Nov. 30, 1973, art. II(d), 1015 U.N.T.S.
243 (1974) (prohibiting racial segregation by area and expropriation of landed
property) [hereinafter Apartheid Convention]; see also International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, art.
5(d)(i), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1966) (prohibiting racial discrimination in freedom of
movement and residence) [hereinafter Racial Discrimination Convention].
73.
See, e.g.. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 12,
1974, G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Agenda Item 48, art. 16, (1975),
reprinted tn 14 I.L.M. 251, 258 (1975) (elimination of apartheid and racial
discrimination as a prerequisite of development); Proposed Text of the Draft Code
of Conduct on TransnatlonalCorporations, U.N. ESCOR, 2d Sess., Annex, Agenda
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right can also be found in "class" legislation regarding workers, 7 5
refugees,7 6 aliens, 7 7 stateless persons,7 8 children,7 9 indigenous
people,8 0 and women.8 1 And protection of the right can be found

Item 7(d),
25, at 9, U.N. Doc. E/1990/94 (1990) (conditions of work and life
subject to ILO's Tripartite Declaration).
74.
See, e.g.. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, June 10, 1972, Recommendations 1. 15, 16, at 6, 8. 9, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.48/14 (1972), reprinted In 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1417-19 (1972) (end to
apartheid and racial segregation; planning for human settlements and
urbanization; demographic policies); World Charterfor Nature, Oct. 28, 1982, G.A.
Res. 37/7, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp No. 51, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 & Add.
1 (1982) (subsistence and settlement of populations); Non-Legally Binding
Authoritative Statement of Principlesfor a Global Consensus on the Management,
Conservation and SustainableDevelopment of All Types of Forests. June 13, 1992,
princ. 5(a), UNCED Doc. A/CONF.151/6/Rev.1, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 881 (1992)
(rights of indigenous populations and other forest dwellers to be protected, inter
alia, In land tenure arrangements).
75.
See, e.g., InternationalConvention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, Feb. 25, 1991, G.A. Res. 45/158,
U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., 69th pin. mtg. at 263-65, arts. 8(2), 14, 15, 20(2), 22
(1991) (right of migrant workers and families to enter and remain in state of
origin; no arbitrary or unlawful interference with home; property rights; no loss of
authorization of residence for failing to fulfill work contract, unless fulfillment Is
condition of authorization; no collective expulsions); Convention Concerning
Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity
and Treatment of Migrant Workers, art. 8(1), in INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1919-1981, 821, 823 (1982) (stating that loss
of employment shall not imply withdrawal of authorization of residence or work
permit).
76.
See, e.g., Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951,
arts. 10, 13, 21, 26, 32, 33, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (continuity of
residence; rights to immovable property; housing; right to choose place of
residence; limits on expulsion and forced return) [hereinafter Refugee
Convention); Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (removing, inter alla, Refugee Convention's time limits in
definition of refugee).
77.
See, e.g., State Responslbllity and InternationalClaims, In 5 HACVORTH
DIGEST § 520, at 471-72 (international minimum standard regarding the
treatment of the alien's person and property).
78.
See, e.g., Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, Sept.
28, 1954, arts. 13, 26, 31, 360 U.N.T.S. 117 (property rights; choice of residence:
non-expulsion) [hereinafter Stateless Persons Convention].
79.
See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, arts.
7(l), 8(1), 9(1), 10(1), 11(1), 16, 28 I.L.M. 1457 (1989) (right to be cared for "as far
as possible" by one's parents; preservation of family relations; children not to be
separated from parents against their will; right to enter and leave state party for
family reunification; obligation to combat illicit transfer and nonreturn of children
abroad; prohibition against arbitrary or unlawful interference with home).
80.
See, e.g., Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, arts. 13, 14, 16, 18, 28 I.L.M. 1382
(confirming relationship of indigenous people with lands occupied; promoting
ownership and possession of traditionally occupied lands; limiting removals from
land; regulating intrusion upon or use of lands) [hereinafter Indigenous Peoples
Convention].
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in human rights instruments aimed at developing
individual
82
rights rather than the rights of groups or classes.
Predictably, a right developed in disparate contexts suffers

from gaps, contradictions, and other anomalies.

Successive

groups of treaty-makers have had very different objects in mind
as they went about their work. In addition, they labored over a
period of time during which both legal views and geopolitical
realities changed dramatically. Explicit treaty references to a
right to stay began about fifty years ago, and some relevant
customary law arose more than one hundred years before that. A
right developed over a long period, by lawmakers with different
goals, should be expected to suffer inconsistencies and other

81.
See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, Dec. 18. 1979, arts. 15(2), 15(4), 16(1}(h), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 19
I.L.M. 33 (1980) (equal rights to administer property; equal rights regarding
freedom of movement and freedom to choose residence and domicile; equality
with husband regarding "ownership, acquisition, management, administration,
enjoyment and disposition of property, whether free of charge or for a valuable
consideration").
82.
Documents of universal application include: Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess. at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]; International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, openedfor signatureDec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 3, 6
I.L.M. 360 [hereinafter Eco Soc Covenant]; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M.
368 (1967) [hereinafter Civ Pol Covenant].
Regional, European instruments include, e.g. Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter European Convention]; Protocol (No. 1) to the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, art. 1,
213 U.N.T.S. 262 (peaceful enjoyment of possessions) [hereinafter European
Protocol No. 1]; Protocol (No. 4) to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Sept. 16, 1963, arts. 2, 3. 4, Europ. T.S. No.
46 (1986), (freedom to choose residence; expulsion of nationals prohibited;
collective expulsion of aliens prohibited) [hereinafter European Protocol No. 4];
Protocol (No. 7) to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Extending the List of Civil and Political Rights, Nov. 22,
1984, art. 1 (limiting individual expulsions of aliens); European Social Charter,
Oct. 18, 1961, art. 19(8), 529 U.N.T.S. 89 (migrant workers' right not to be
expelled).
Regional, American instruments include, e.g. American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, O.A.S. Res. 30, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.
L/V/I.4 Rev. (1965) [hereinafter American Declaration]; American Convention on
Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. K/XVI/1.1, Doc. 65,
Rev.1, Corr.2, (1970). reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) [hereinafter American
Convention].
Regional, African instruments include, e.g., African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5, reprintedIn
21 I.L.M. 59 (1982) [hereinafter Banjul Charter].
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forms of incoherence. 8 3 The worry over differences, however,
clouds the larger, more important picture. In document after
document, whenever or wherever treaty-makers have taken up
subjects related to the question of where people live, a right to
stay has been protected in some form. The significant fact is the
right's recurrence.
A. The Law of War

Under international law, a right not to be moved is explicitly
guaranteed in two contexts. The first is the law of war. Article 49
of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War (Geneva Convention) provides:
Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of
protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the
Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not,
are prohibited, regardless of their motive.
Nevertheless, the Occupying Power may undertake total or
partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the population
or imperative military reasons so demand. Such evacuations may
not involve the displacement of protected persons outside the
bounds of the occupied territory except when for material reasons
it is impossible to avoid such displacement.
Persons thus
evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as
hostilities In the area in question have ceased.
The Occupying Power undertaking such transfers or evacuations
shall ensure, to the greatest practicable extent, that proper
accommodation is provided to receive the protected persons, that
the removals are effected in satisfactory conditions of hygiene,
health, safety and nutrition, and that members of the same family

are not separated.
The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer
parts of its own
84
civilian population into the territory it occupies.

This convention was concluded shortly after World War II and has
enjoyed virtually universal support ever since;8 5 its provisions on
forced movement are remarkably strong and detailed.
They
unambiguously condemn forcible transfers of several sorts,
"regardless of motive," and then carefully specify the exceptions
under which forced movements are permissible. The treaty even
imposes operational requirements on those movements that are
permissible. A later protocol to the convention makes a violation

83.
See Claire Palley, Population Transfers, In BROADENING THE FRONTIERS
OF HuMAN RIGHTS 219, 219 (Donna Gomien ed., 1993) ("[Alccidents of historical
development and ad hoc evolution of specific situational rules" have obscured
similarities in population transfers.).
84.
Geneva Convention, supra note 70, art. 49.
85.
More than 180 nations are parties to the convention, including the
United States. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 414-15 (1995).
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86
of these provisions a "grave breach" of that protocol, and thus a
87
both the perpetrators and their superiors
war crime, subjecting
88
to criminal liability.
Despite its strength, Article 49 only applies during war or
other international armed conflict, and only to those conflicts

between parties to the treaty. 89 Furthermore, it applies only for
the benefit of civilians, not otherwise covered under related

conventions regarding military personnel and prisoners of war, 90
who: i) are nationals of a nonneutral state that is a treaty party,
and (ii) find themselves in the hands of another state that is also

a treaty party. 9 1
A later protocol extends similar protections to armed conflicts
within a single state, primarily those in which the state's own
2
forces face a well-organized, territory-holding opponent. 9 Article
17 of that protocol provides:

Protocol I. supra note 70, art. 85(4)(a).
86.
Id. art. 85(5).
87.
Id. art. 86(2).
88.
Geneva Convention, supra note 70, art. 2 (The convention applies to
89.
wars and other armed conflicts (I) between treaty parties and (ii) between treaty
The
parties and non-treaty parties who accept and apply its provisions.).
provisions may extend to other international conflicts on the theory that the
convention is declaratory of customary international law, generally binding in all
states. See, e.g., 2 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 165-66 (3d ed.
1968) (discussing status of Geneva Convention as custom); Theodor Meron,
Deportationof Civilians as a War Crime Under Customary Law, in BROADENING THE
FRONTIERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 201 (Donna Gomien ed., 1993) (Deportations from
occupied territories had been prohibited under customary international law
before the Geneva Convention.).
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
90.
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12,
1949. 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
Geneva Convention, supra note 70, art. 4. Article 49 also presumes
91.
the existence of "occupied territory." That is, if a civilian falls into the hands of
the enemy in the course of hostilities, but before "occupation" of the relevant area
Is established, Article 49 does not yet apply. Id. art. 49. See FRITS KALSHOVEN,
CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR 55 (1987) (discussing that a territory is

"occupied" only when "actually placed under the authority of the hostile army")
(quoting Hague Regulations, supra note 70); Davis P. Goodman, Note, The Need
for Fundamental Change in the Law of Belligerent Occupation, 37 STAN. L. REV.
1573, 1573-75 (1985) ("Occupation" begins when actual fighting has ceased in an
area, and the occupier has control, having ousted the local sovereign.).
Protocol II supra note 70, art. 1 (Protocol II applies to armed conflicts
92.
within the territory of one treaty party. "between its armed forces and dissident
armed forces... which, under responsible command, exercise such control over
a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted
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1. The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered
for reasons related to the conflict unless the security of the
civilians involved or Imperative military reasons so demand.
Should such displacements have to be carried out, all possible
measures shall be taken in order that the civilian population may
be received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene,
health, safety and nutrition.
2. Civilians shall not be compelled9 to
3 leave their own territory for
reasons connected with the conflict.

This provision is less detailed than the original one covering
international
conflicts, but still explicitly secures a right not to be
94
moved.
B. The Rights of Indigenous Peoples
Internationally, an explicit guarantee of a right to stay
appears in one other context, relating to the rights of indigenous
peoples. The International Labour Organization's Convention
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries (Indigenous Peoples Convention),9 5 adopted in 1989,
aims to establish the rights, Inter alla, of people whose ancestors
inhabited a place later conquered or colonized, and who currently

retain at least some of their own social, political, or similar
institutions.9 6

Part II of the Indigenous Peoples Convention

concerns land rights, and several of its provisions are relevant to
this discussion.
The land provisions begin with Article 13: "In applying the
provisions of this Part of the Convention governments shall
respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual
values of the peoples concerned of their relationship with the
lands... which they occupy or otherwise use, and in particular
the collective aspects of this relationship. "97 This Article is
remarkable for explicitly recognizing the ties that bind people to
the land they inhabit.
Such explicit recognition Is rare

military operations and to implement this Protocol," but not including riots and
similar disturbances.).
93.
Id. art. 17.
94.
See generally Christa Meindersma, Legal Issues Surrounding Population
Transfers in Conflict Situations, 41 NETH. INT'L L. REV.31 (1994).
95.
Indigenous Peoples Convention, supra note 80.
Although the
convention entered into force on Sept. 5, 1991, at present only four states have
become parties: Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, and Norway.
96.
Id. art. 1(b) (definition of indigenous populations); see also Id. art. l(a)
(definition of tribal peoples); Id. art. 2 (importance of self-identification).
97.
Id. art. 13(1).
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internationally ss and its appearance in a recent treaty suggests a
It is curious that this
growing recognition of those ties.
recognition should come, for apparently the first and only time, in
relation to indigenous and tribal peoples, implying that close ties
to the land are only possible for persons with ancestors of a
particular sort.
Article 14 of the Indigenous Peoples Convention provides:
1.

The rights of ownership and possession of the peoples

concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be
recognized. In addition, measures shall be taken in appropriate
cases to safeguard the right of the peoples concerned to use lands
not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have
traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional
activities....

2.

Governments shall take steps as necessary to identify

the lands which the peoples concerned traditionally occupy, and to
protection of their rights of ownership and
guarantee effective
99
possession.

In this Article, the convention seeks to regularize and legalize
the relationship between indigenous peoples and the land they
occupy by securing their use with rights of use and their
possession with rights of possession and ownership. This, too, is
an
unequivocal
it
represents
because
remarkable,
recommendation for the use and expansion of rights in private
property. This is both novel and ironic in an international legal
system that, for the past forty years, has treated the institution of
private property as if it were a debilitating and highly
communicable disease, primarily to be quarantined and never
encouraged.10 0 Traces of this view can still be seen in Article 14's
failure to use the phrase "private property" and in the collective
cast to its suggestion that legal rights to possession be
established.
Finally, in Article 16 of the Indigenous Peoples Convention,
the right to stay is explicitly established:
Subject to the following paragraphs of this Article, the
1.
peoples concerned shall not be removed from the lands which they
occupy.
2.
Where the relocation of these peoples is considered
necessary as an exceptional measure, such relocation shall take

place only with their free and informed consent. Where their
consent cannot be obtained, such relocation shall take place only
following appropriate procedures established by national laws and

98.

It seems simply to have been taken for granted, for example, in the law

of war's prohibition of forced transfers. See supra notes 84-94 and accompanying
text.
99.
Indigenous Peoples Convention, supra note 80, art. 14.
See Infra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
100.
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regulations, including public inquiries where appropriate, which
provide the opportunity for effective representation of the people
concerned.
3.
Whenever possible. these peoples shall have the right to
return to their traditional lands, as soon as the grounds for
relocation cease to exist.
4.
When such return is not possible, as determined by
agreement or, in the absence of such agreement, through
appropriate procedures, these peoples shall be provided in all
possible cases with lands of quality and legal status at least equal
to that of the lands previously occupied by them, suitable to

provide for their present needs and future development. Where the
peoples concerned express a preference for compensation in money
or in kind, they shall be so compensated under appropriate
guarantees.
5.
Persons thus relocated
shall be fully compensated for
101
any resulting loss or injury.

Not surprisingly, this Article shares the form of the Geneva
Convention's Article 49;102 it contains a statement of the
prohibition against forced movement, a provision for exceptions,
and a statement of rules and procedures to be followed in
executing permissible removals.
The two articles share
commonalties of substance as well, including a high level of
necessity required before a forced movement can be justified and
a strong preference for temporary dislocations rather than
permanent ones. Finally, and sadly, the two articles share a
limited range of application. Although each constitutes a model of
"right to stay" legislation, neither applies universally, and the
Indigenous Peoples Convention has attracted so few parties that,
103
symbolism aside, its practical effect is severely limited.
C. Rights of Aliens
One hundred years before these developments, international
law had developed another manifestation of the right to stay. By
the middle of the nineteenth century, customary international law
had come to protect both the personal security and the property

of persons living in states other than their own, a protection that
helped to keep aliens from being moved against their will.
Individuals, of course, are always subject to the laws and
regulations of the nation in which they live, regardless of whether
they are citizens.' 0 4 Nonetheless, by the mid-nineteenth century

101. Indigenous Peoples Convention, supra note 80, art. 16.
102. Geneva Convention, supra note 70, art. 49.
103. See supra note 95 (only four parties to Indigenous Peoples
Convention).
104.
See, e.g., JAms L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 278 (Sir Humphrey
Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963); HACKWORTH DIGEST. supra note 77, at 471; ALWYN V.
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states considered themselves obliged to accord aliens within their
borders a certain minimal level of treatment. To put it in a way
that makes the rule's origins clearer, states considered that their
own nationals were entitled to a minimal level of civilized
treatment when they entered the territory of other states. If their
citizens were not so treated, the states whose nationals were
mistreated had a claim against the offending states. The basic
05
structure of this legal regime continues to the present day.'
When aliens are forcibly moved from their homes, the
international minimum standard is implicated. Traditionally, that
standard has at least two components, the first regarding the
treatment of aliens generally and the second regarding the
treatment of aliens' property. The general standard is violated if

the state's action "amountis] to an outrage, to bad faith, to willful
neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so
far short of international standards that every reasonable and
impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency."' 0 6 A
forced move from one's home, whether across the street or across
the border, can obviously be carried out so savagely or viciously
that it constitutes a violation of this standard, but such a
violation concerns the conditions of the move rather than the
move itself. Restrictions on the very fact of movement, something
closer to a right to stay, are instead grounded in the property
component of the international minimum standard.
The traditional view is that a state may take the property of
an alien only for a public purpose, in return for compensation
that is prompt, adequate, and effective, and in a way that does
not discriminate unreasonably between different classes of aliens
or between aliens and nationals.' 0 7 Such protection does not
preclude a forced move, but, by severely limiting the conditions
under which real property is taken, the right to stay can be

FREEMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR DENIAL OF JUSTICE 73

(1938).
105.
See, e.g., Richard B. Lillich, The CurrentStatus of the Law of State
Responsibilityfor Injuries to Aliens, In INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 1, 2-3 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1983); F. V. GARCIA-AMADOR
ET AL., RECENT CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO

ALIENS 1-2 (1974); ANDREAS H. ROTH, THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPLIED TO ALIENS (1949); FREEMAN, supra note 104, at 53-83.
106.
Neer v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.). 4 R.I.A.A. 60, 61-62 (Oct.
15, 1926).
107.

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 712(1) & cmts. (b)-(f) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT); Oscar Schachter,
Compensation for Expropriation, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 121, 123 (1984); Marian L.
Nash, ContemporaryPractice of the United States Relating to International Law, 74
AM. J. INT'L L. 657, 662 (1980).
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secured in much the same way that the "takings clause" of the
U.S. Constitution secures the U.S. right not to be moved. I0 8
Two possible limits should be noted. First, as a historical
matter, the property safeguards of the international minimum
standard have been applied most commonly to the expropriation
of foreign-owned businesses and other commercial property.10 9
There is not much available evidence of their application to resist
or condemn the forced movement of individual families from their
homes. Still, the traditional rules make no distinction between

commercial and residential property. 110 In addition, the property
rules have in fact been used to oppose forced movements of
families when their scale is sufficiently large to generate public
debate and documentary evidence. 1 1 '
Second, historical usage aside, the current details-even the
very existence-of an international minimum standard regarding
property are open to question. 112 For decades, several Latin
American states have resisted the proposition that there is a
minimum international standard for the treatment of aliens,
arguing instead that aliens are entitled only to the same
treatment as the host country's own nationals. 113 Beginning after
World War If, and accelerating during the 1960s and 1970s,
states in other parts of the world began to object to the
international standard. Obsessed with the related phenomena of
colonialism, imperialism, and private foreign capital, many states
sought to modify or abrogate the restrictions on expropriations
that required compensation of the traditional sort, or indeed, that
permitted
any international
oversight
over
"domestic"

108. See supranotes 32-35 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Sedco, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 180 (1986) (oil drilling rigs, related equipment and land); Texaco Overseas
Petroleum Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic (U.S. v. Libya), reprinted In 17 I.L.M. 1
(1978) (property and rights of two U.S. oil companies); Factory at Chorzow. Merits
(Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13) (nitrate factory); Certain
German Interests in Polish Upper Silesla, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7 (nitrate
factory and other property of two German companies).
110. See supranote 107 and accompanying text.
111. Property arguments were made, for example, to oppose the mass
expulsion of Asians from Uganda in 1972. For a relevant debate In the United
Nations, see U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., General Comm. (203d mtg.) at 35-37, U.N.

Doc. A/BUR/SR.203 (1972). See also Frank Wooldridge & Vishnu D. Sharma,
International Law and the Expulsion of Ugandan Asians, 9 INT'L LAW. 30. 62-74
(1975); Richard Plender. The Ugandan Crisis and the Right of Expulsion Under
International Law, INT'L COMM. JuRISTS (Dec. 1972) at 19. 27; R. C. Chhangani,
Notes and Comments, Expulsion of Uganda Asians and International Law, 12
INDIAN J. INT'L L. 400, 403-05 (1972).

112. For a concise account of the situation, see RESTATEMENT, supra note
107. § 712 Reporters' Note 1.
113. See MALCOLM N. SHAw, INTERNATIONAL LAw 512 (3d ed. 1991).
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expropriation decisions, 114 developments famously contained in a
series of resolutions from the United Nations General
Assembly. 1 5 Now, in the 1990s, there is legitimate debate about
whether a new standard for expropriation has come into
existence, and, if so, what exactly are its terms. National
opinions vary significantly, and, in the face of this variation, it
would be foolhardy to suggest that the right to stay is reliably
secured around the world by11 6the property prong of the
international minimum standard.
D. InternationalHuman Rights

The laws of war, the laws regarding the treatment of
indigenous peoples, and the international minimum standard all
help to establish a right to stay, but in clearly limited contexts.
Universal protection that applies to everyone, all the time, can
instead be found in a series of human rights documents
developed and adopted after World War II. International human
rights documents are significant because they typically pertain to
all persons-citizens, aliens, and stateless persons-living within
a nation's borders 117 and are not limited in their application

114.

See, e.g., R.P. ANAND, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

40-41 (1986); S.N. Guha Roy, Is the Law of Responsibility of States for Injuries to
Aliens a Partof UniversalInternationalLaw?, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 863, 866-69 (1961).
115. General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc.
A/5217 (1962); General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 3171, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N.
Doc. A/9030 (1973), reprintedin 13 I.L.M. 238 (1974); Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States. G.. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N.
Doc. A/9631 (1974); Declaration on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N.

Doc. A/9559 (1974).
116. Several nations have denied the existence of any international
Others have officially recognized
standard regarding expropriations.
modifications. The United States, on the other hand, has steadfastly taken the
position that the traditional standard-no discrimination, public purpose, and
prompt, adequate and effective compensation-is still the binding international
standard for expropriations. See, e.g., Pamela B. Gann, Compensation Standard

for Expropriation,23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 615, 618-20 (1985); Brice M. Clagett,
The Expropriation Issue Before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunab Is "Just
Compensation" Required by InternationalLaw or Not?, 16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
813, 815 (1984).
117. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 107, § 701 ("A state is obligated to
respect the human rights of persons subject to Itsjurisdiction." (emphasis added));

Id., Part VII, Introductory Note, at 144 (International human rights apply "to all
human beings, not to aliens alone.").
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either to times of war or peace. 118 These documents do not create
a "right to stay" in those precise terms, but establish a series of
closely related rights that collectively prohibit the forced
movement of individuals and groups.
1. The Right to Property
In U.S. law, property rights play a major roie in securing a
right to stay. The situation is far different internationally. In

1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the Universal
Declaration) succinctly and straightforwardly declared, in Article
17, that "[elveryone has the right to own property alone as well as
in association with others." "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived
120
of his property." 1 9 Despite its strength, Article 17 lacks detail
and is limited elsewhere by broadly stated exceptions for
"morality, public order, and the general welfare in a democratic
society."' 2 In addition, the Universal Declaration is by its own
terms a "common standard of achievement" 12 2 rather than a
binding legal obligation.' 2 3 Limited as it is, however, Article 17
marks the zenith of international law's protection of a universal
right to private property.
Affected by the same experiences of colonialism, imperialism,
and foreign capital that helped to destabilize the property
component of the international minimum standard 24 and driven
by a commitment to socialism in one or more of its many forms, a
number of states found themselves increasingly unwilling to
accept an international legal obligation to uphold the institution

118.
Such documents typically permit state derogations from required
conduct during times of war or other public emergency. See, e.g., Civ Pol
Covenant, supra note 82, art. 4. The documents themselves, and the rights
established therein, however, presumptively apply at all times.
119. UniversalDeclaration,supra note 82, art. 17.
120. See, e.g., Gudmundur Alfredson, Article 17, In THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY 255, 256-57 [hereinafter UNIVERSAL

DECLARATION] (Asbjorn Eide et al. eds., 1992) (Despite the absence of explicit
exceptions, "it Is foreseen that persons can be deprived of their property under
certain circumstances.").
121.
Universal Declaration,supra note 82, art. 29(2); see also THE CHARTER
OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 783 (Bruno Simma ed., 1994) (possibility of

misuse of exceptions).
122. Universal Declaration,supra note 82, prmbl.

123.

On the legal status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, see,

e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 107, Part VII, Introductory Note, at 147; id., § 701
Reporters' Notes 4 & 6; THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY,

supra note 121, at 783-84; SHAW, supra note 113, at 196-97; HERSH LAUTERPACHT,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HuMAN RIGHTS 408-17 (1950).

124.

See supranotes 114-16 and accompanying text.
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of private property. 125 The reticence is clearly symbolized by the
absence of property rights from the two great international
covenants that followed the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which were designed to flesh out and make legally binding
the aims of the earlier instrument. 126 The International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, for example, establishes
universal human rights to work, to join trade unions, to social
security, to an adequate standard of living, to education, and to
the highest attainable standards of physical and mental
health.127 There is, however, no mention of a right to own
property. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
secures to everyone a right to life, to liberty, to a fair criminal
process, to freedom from torture and slavery, and to freedom of

thought, assembly, and association. 12 8

Once again, however,

there is no mention of a right to own property. The United States
has taken the position that the omission of private property rights
in both Covenants was not intended to eliminate or weaken those

rights, 12 9 but the omission certainly did nothing to strengthen
them. Other human rights instruments of universal significance
guarantee to particular groups equality with others in their rights
to property, but those instruments are silent on just what those
property rights must be or the conditions under which they may
30
be abridged.1

125. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 107, § 702 cmt. k (wide
disagreement among states as to the scope and content of the property right);
PAUL SIEGHART. THE LAvFUL RIGHTS OF MANKIND 130-31 (1985) (describing reticence
to adopt an international right to property); MANOUCHEHR GANI, INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 143 (1962) (early U.N. difficulties in adopting human
rights provisions regarding property).
126. On the relation between the International Covenants and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 107, part VII,
Introductory Note, at 145; td. § 701, Reporters' Note 6. On the absence of
property rights from the two International Covenants, see, e.g., Alfredson, supra
note 120, at 259-60.
127. Eco Soc Covenant, supra note 82, arts. 6 (right to work); 8 (trade
unions); 9 (social security); 11 (adequate standard of living); 12 (physical and
mental health); and 13 (education).
128. Civ Pol Covenant, supra note 82; arts. 6 (life); 7 (torture); 8 (slavery); 9
(liberty); 14 (fair trial); 18 & 19 (freedom of thought); 21 (assembly); 22
(association).
129. See Nash, supra note 107, at 662.
130. See, e.g., Apartheid Convention, supra note 72, art. 11(d) (no
discrimination or segregation in land rights); Racial Discrimination Convention,
supra note 72, art. 5(d)(v) (no racial discrimination in right to own property);
Stateless Persons Convention, supra note 78, art. 13 (equality of treatment
between stateless persons and aliens regarding movable and immovable
property).
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The right to property has fared better in regional
instruments. The American Convention on Human Rights (the
American Convention), with twenty-four state parties, provides
that "[e]veryone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his
property."'13 1 The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
(the Banjal Charter), with forty-nine state parties, provides that
"the right to property shall be guaranteed." 1 32 Finally, Protocol
(No. 1) to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, with twenty-three state
parties, provides that "[elvery natural or legal person is entitled to
the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions." 133 In each case,
however, the rights described can be overcome by a vaguely
described public interest,' 3 4 and only the American Convention
explicitly requires compensation for a public taking, 135 which is
the most effective way to insure the seriousness of the public
need.
In sum, the right to stay is promoted, but far from
guaranteed, by an international right to private property.' 3 6 No
universally applicable human rights treaty recognizes an
individual right to private property, and many states are not party
to any regional treaty that does. Even parties to the regional

arrangements can legitimately interpret their property obligations
differently, and the right to property clearly means more in some
jurisdictions than in others. A right to stay secured in this way Is
thus secured unevenly. Finally, even with a growing agreement
on the meaning of the regional property rights,' 3 7 the distribution

131. American Convention, supra note 82, art. 21. See also American
Declaration, supra note 82, art. XXXIII ("Every person has the right to own such
private property as meets the essential needs of decent living and helps to
maintain the dignity of the individual and of the home.").
132. Banjul Charter, supra note 82, art. 14.
133. European Protocol No. 1. supra note 82, art. 1.
134. Id. art. 1 (The state has the right to control the use of property "in
accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties."); Banjul Charter, supra note 82, art. 14 (Property right
"may only be encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the general
interest of the community and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate
laws."); American Convention, supra note 82,art. 21(1) (The use and enjoyment of
property may be subordinated to "the interest of society.").
135. American Convention, supra note 82, art. 21(2). But see Banjul
Charter, supra note 82, art. 21(2) (dispossessed "people" entitled to lawful
recovery of their property as well as to "adequate compensation").
136. Paul Sieghart concludes: "[W]hatever the 'right to property' may be, It
is more weakly protected than any other" in international human rights treaties.
SIEGHART, supra note 125. at 132.

137. This is inevitable as experience develops with each of these
instruments and the clauses they contain. The development of the "European"
property right, for example, is traced in A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRILLS, HUMAN
RIGHTS INEUROPE 213-18 (3d ed. 1993).

1996]

THE RIGHT TO STAY

of property, especially long-term interests in real property, varies
so significantly among nations that property law's protection of a
right to stay varies significantly as well.
But the desire to stay is a strong one, and international law
has developed a series of rights that protects this desire
regardless of how private property is viewed or distributed.
Almost every major human rights document developed since
World War II has recognized and reinforced a right not to be
expelled from one's own country, a right to choose one's
residence, and a right to be protected against arbitrary
interference with one's home.138
These are the primary
guarantees against forced movement. Depending on the details,

forced movements can also implicate international human rights
against discrimination
the

rights

to

13 9

life, 14 1

and degrading treatment,14 0 as well as
self-determination, 1 4 2

free

choice

of

employment, 143 and culture. 144 This Article concentrates on the
primary guarantees.

138. Each of these rights will be discussed infra, Part lII.D.2, 3, and 4.
139. See, e.g., American Declaration, supra note 82. art. 2; American
Convention, supra note 82, art. 1; Banjul Charter, supra note 82, art. 2; Racial
Discrimination Convention, supra note 72, art. 1; Stateless Persons Convention,
supra note 78, art. 3; European Convention, supra note 82, art. 14; Civ Pol
Covenant, supra note 82, art. 2; Universal Declaration,supra note 82, art. 2; see
also U.N. Charter art. 1, 3 (a United Nations purpose to promote human rights
"without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion").
140. E.g., American Convention, supra note 82, art 5; American
Declaration, supra note 82, art. 26; Banjul Charter, supra note 82, art. 5; Racial
Discrimination Convention, supra note 72, art. 5(b); European Convention, supra
note 82, art. 3; Civ Pol Covenant, supra note 82, art. 7; Universal Declaration,
supra note 82, art. 5.
141. E.g., American Convention, supra note 82, art. 4; American
Declaration, supra note 82, art. 1; BanJul Charter, supra note 82, art. 4;
European Convention, supra note 82, art. 2; Civ Pol Covenant, supra note 82, art.
6; Universal Declaration,supra note 82, art. 3.
142. E.g., Banjul Charter, supra note 82. art. 20; Civ Pol Covenant, supra
note 82, art. 1; Eco Soc Covenant, supra note 82. art. 1; Universal Declaration,
supra note 82, art. 21(3); see also U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, 2 (respect for selfdetermination of peoples). The notion of self-determination is most commonly
applied to peoples rather than individuals, so it would be implicated primarily
when groups of persons are forced to move from their homes.
143. E.g., American Declaration, supra note 82, art. 14; Banjul Charter,
supra note 82, art. 15; Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 72, art.
5(e)(i); European Social Charter, supra note 82, art. 1; Eco Soc Covenant, supra
note 82, art. 6; UniversalDeclaration,supra note 82, art. 23.
144. E.g., American Declaration, supra note 82, art. 13; Racial
Discrimination Convention, supra note 72, art. 5(e)(6); Eco Soc Covenant, supra
note 82, art. 15; Civ Pol Covenant, supra note 82, art. 27; Universal Declaration,
supra note 82, art. 27.
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2. Freedom from Expulsion
In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
condemned arbitrary exile, 145 and almost every major human
rights instrument since that time has contained a proscription
against expulsion across national borders. 14 6
As might be
expected, the prohibition is seldom absolute, but Is subject to
exceptions provided by law, based on requirements of national
security, public order, health, or morality. 14 7 Of greater interest,
however, are the distinctions often made in these instruments
between nationals and aliens on the one hand, and between
individual and mass expulsions on the other. Nationals are more

likely to be protected than aliens, 148 and groups are more likely to
be

protected

than

individuals. 14 9

Such

distinctions

are

145.
Universal Declaration,supra note 82, art. 9.
146. E.g., American Declaration, supra note 82, art. 8; American
Convention, supra note 82, art. 22; BanJul Charter, supra note 82, art. 12;
Stateless Persons Convention, supra note 78, art. 31; European Protocol No. 4,
supra note 82, arts. 3 & 4; European Social Charter, supra note 82, art. 19(8); Civ
Pol Covenant, supra note 82, art. 13.
147, E.g., American Declaration, supra note 82, art. 28 (rights limited by
security of all, general welfare and advancement of democracy); American
Convention, supra note 82, art. 22(3) (crime prevention, national security, public
safety, public order, public morals, public health); Stateless Persons Convention,
supra note 78, art. 31(1) (national security and public order); European Social
Charter, supra note 82, art. 19(8) (national security, public interest or morality);
Universal Declaration, supra note 82, art. 29(2) (morality, public order, general
welfare).
148.
Some human rights instruments flatly prohibit the expulsion of
nationals under any circumstances. E.g., American Declaration, supra note 82,
art. 8 (A national has the right not to leave his home state "except by his own
will."); American Convention, supra note 82, art. 22(5) (Nationals cannot be
expelled from their home states.); European Protocol No. 4, supra note 82, art.
3(1) (Nationals cannot be expelled from their home states.). Aliens and stateless
people are not so well protected. See, e.g., American Convention, supra note 82,
art. 22(6) (Aliens can be expelled pursuant to a "decision reached in accordance
with law."); Banjul Charter, supra note 82, art. 12(4) (A nonnational can be
expelled pursuant to a "decision taken in accordance with the law."); Stateless
Persons Convention, supra note 78, art. 31 (Stateless persons can be expelled for
reasons of national security or public order, pursuant to "a decision reached in
accordance with due process of law," subject to other restrictions,); Civ Pol

Covenant, supra note 82, art. 13 (Aliens can be expelled pursuant to lawful
decision and other requirements.). See also THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS ACROSS
BORDERS 85-97 (Louis B. Sohn & Thomas Buergenthal eds., 1992) (expulsion
rules regarding aliens and nationals); Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Limits of the
Power of Expulsion in Public International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INTL L. 55 (1977)
(limits on states' power to expel aliens).
149.
Mass expulsions are more likely to be prohibited than individual
expulsions. Because nationals are often considered safe from expulsion, this
distinction usually manifests itself as a prohibition against the mass expulsion
(but not the individual expulsion) of aliens. E.g., American Convention, supra
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commonplace in international

law, where the concept

of

nationality is both fundamental and pervasive, I5 0 and where the
have a bearing on its
numerical dimensions of a problem often
15
suitability for international resolution. 1

Still, from the viewpoint of the basic human interest involved,
From the individual's
the distinctions are decidedly odd.
perspective, home is home; the color of one's passport makes no
difference. It begs the question to argue that the distinction
between nationals and aliens is justified because aliens have a
lowered expectation of security. Expectations are lowered (if
indeed they are) mainly because international law has heretofore
15 2
commonly made distinctions between aliens and nationals.
Nor does it matter much, from the individual's perspective,
whether he or she is expelled individually or with many others. It
is untenable to suggest that the disruption to one's life is made
worse because others' lives are similarly disrupted. International

note 82, art. 22(9) (collective expulsion of aliens prohibited); Banjul Charter,
supra note 82, art. 12(5) (mass expulsion of nonnationals prohibited); European
Protocol No. 4, supra note 82, art. 4 (collective expulsion of aliens prohibited).
See generally Jean-Marie Henckaerts. The Current Status and Content of the
Prohibition of Mass Expulsion of Aliens, 15 HUM. RTS. L.J. 301 (1994) (exemplary
survey of current law and practice).
150. See, e.g., SHAW, supra note 113, at 504.
[Nationality is]... the vital link between the individual and the benefits of
international law. Although international law is now moving to a stage
whereby individuals may acquire rights free from the interposition of the
state, the basic proposition remains that in a state-oriented world system,
it is only through the medium of the state that the individual may obtain
the full range of benefits under international law, and nationality is the
key.
Id.
151. A great many issues do not reach international attention until the
numbers of people involved grow sufficiently large. A single, unjustified killing of
a citizen by a police officer will not usually generate international attention; a
killing of thousands will. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 107, § 702(g) & cmt. m. (A
state violates customary international law if it practices, encourages, or condones
a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights.).
152. See generally RIcHARD B. LILLICH, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALIENS IN
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (1984). The situation is slowing changing, but
aliens still suffer special vulnerabilities under international law. Professor Lillich
concludes:
While the trend has been towards greater protection of the alien from the
chilling effect of the State's far-reaching sovereign powers over his or her
admission, stay and expulsion, the extent of such protection varies
greatly, leaving aliens in many States inadequately protected, both
substantively and procedurally, at the present time.
Id. at 122.
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law may well be justified, on other grounds, in drawing the
distinctions of nationality and numbers in the law of
expulsions,' 5 3 but these distinctions create and sustain an
obvious dissonance between factual desire and legal right.
Indeed, the dissonance helps to explain international law's
sporadic movement toward obliterating these distinctions, as seen
most clearly in the development of the European human rights
system' 5 4 and the fairly constant suggestions of commentators
and scholars to the same effect. 15 5
3. Freedom of Residence
Expulsion law only catches relocations at the border, keeping
individuals in the country, but not in their homes. Further
protection is provided by the "freedom of residence," which, like
the freedom from expulsion, has been proclaimed in almost every
major human rights instrument since the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.' 5 6 But, unlike the freedom from expulsion, the
freedom of residence has not been limited by nationality or
numbers.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for
example, extends the freedom of residence to "everyone." 157 The
African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights extends it to
"every individual." 158 Even the most restrictive versions of the
right, found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and regional European and U.S. instruments, add only the

quaification that persons be "lawfully within" the territory of the
state in order to enjoy the freedom of residence.15 9
153. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
154. European human rights instruments have removed the distinction
between individual and mass expulsions of nationals, European Protocol No. 4,
supra note 82, art. 3(1), and prohibit mass expulsions of aliens, Id., art. 4. This
leaves open only the possibility of expelling individual aliens. The European
Social Charter protects one class of aliens, migrant workers from other states who
are parties to the Charter, from individual expulsion, except on specifically
delineated grounds. European Social Charter, supra note 82, art. 19(8).
155. E.g.. Plender, supra note 111, at 19-27.
156. The Universal Declaration provides that "[elveryone has the right to
freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state." Universal
Declaration, supra note 82, art. 13. Similar language appears in: American
Declaration, supra note 82, art. 8; American Convention, supra note 82, art. 22;
Banjul Charter, supra note 82, art. 12; Racial Discrimination Convention, supra
note 72. art. 5(d)(i); Stateless Persons Convention, supra note 78, art. 26;
European Protocol No. 4, supra note 82, art. 2(1); Civ Pol Covenant, supra note
82, art. 12.
157. UniversalDeclaration,supra note 82, art. 13.
158. Banjul Charter, supra note 82, art. 12(1).
159. Civ Pol Covenant, supra note 82, art. 12(1) (freedom of residence
extended to "[e]veryone lawfully within the territory"); European Convention,
supra note 82, art. 2(1) ("[elveryone lawfully within the territory"); American
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Still, the freedom of residence is not the same as a right to
stay, and at least one regional version of the freedom is very
different indeed. The American Convention on Human Rights
provides that "[every person lawfully in the territory of a State
Party has the right to move about in it and to reside in it subject
to the provisions of the law."160 The phrasing suggests that
everyone has a right to reside somewhere in the state, but not in
any place in particular, including one's current home. This
reading is bolstered by the earlier American Declaration on the
Rights and Duties of Man, which provides that "[elvery person has
the right to fix his residence within the territory of the state of
which he is a national," 16 1 again suggesting a right to reside
somewhere within the state, but nowhere in particular. On such
a reading, an individual could certainly be moved, and moved
more than once, so long as another place within the national
borders were always made available.
Elsewhere the right is stronger. While the U.S. regional
system establishes a right "to reside in" a state, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human
162
and Peoples' Rights speak instead of a "freedom of residence."
This small but significant change in language implies an ability to
choose where one lives. Indeed, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and European human rights documents
are explicit in declaring that everyone lawfully within the territory
1 63
of a state has the "freedom to choose his residence."
Still, the "freedom to choose one's residence" is an illusive
freedom, and only partially protects a right to stay. A "freedom to
choose" clearly covers the initial decision to move to a place, but
not so clearly the continuing residence in a place. The connection
between the two is one of logic and standard legal interpretation:
a freedom to make the initial choice of residence would largely be
eviscerated if the state were permitted to overturn that choice
immediately or whenever, thereafter, it wished. To give substance
to any decisional right, one must limit the right of others (in this
case, the right of the state) to overturn the decisions actually

Convention, supra note 82, art. 22(1) ("[elvery person lawfully in the territory").
Only the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man has limited the
freedom of residence to nationals. American Declaration, supra note 82, art. 8.
160. American Convention, supra note 82, art. 22(1).
161. American Declaration, supranote 82, art. 8.
162. Universal Declaration,supra note 82, art. 13(1); Banjul Charter, supra
note 82, art. 12(1).
163. Civ Pol Covenant, supra note 82, art. 12(1). See, e.g., European
Convention, supra note 82, art. 2(1).
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made. For this reason, it is commonly assumed that the164
freedom
to choose one's residence entails a right not to be moved.
The freedom of residence, however, does not fully protect a
right to stay. There are three reasons for this conclusion. First,
the freedom of residence is itself riddled with exceptions. The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is typical,
permitting restrictions on the freedom of residence for reasons of
"national security, public order (ordre public), public health or
morals or the rights and freedoms of others,"'165 as well as
subjecting the freedom to complete suspension in times of "public
emergency." 166
In the European and U.S. versions of the
freedom, one's choice of residence can be limited for all the
reasons set out in the International Covenant, 16 7 on the
additional grounds of "public safety" and crime prevention, 16 8 and
for "particular areas," whenever justified by "the public interest in
a democratic society."x6 9 A right to stay, derived from this
freedom, is necessarily subject to the same long list of exceptions.
Second, even when the "freedom of residence" applies, it does
not guarantee the right to choose any particular residence. The
present author, for example, has no "right" to choose Apartment
17A at 1224 North Lake Shore Drive in Chicago, a choice that
would doubtlessly upset the current owners and puzzle the

164.
E.g. Stavropoulou. supra note 8, at 726 (The right not to move is a
component of freedom of movement.); Christopher M. Goebel, A Unifled Concept of
PopulationTransfer (Revised), 22 DENV. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 1, 18 (1993) (Population
transfer may violate freedom of movement and freedom to choose residence.);
Rosalyn Higgins, Liberty of Movement Within the Territory of a State: The
Contribution of the Committee on Human Rights, In INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF
PERPLEXITY 325, 336 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1989) (forced removals "necessarily
incompatible" with the right freely to select one's residence).
165.
Civ Pol Covenant, supra note 82, art. 12(3).
166. Id. art. 4(1).
167. See European Protocol No. 4, supra note 82, art. 2(3) (grounds for
exceptions to freedom of residence); American Convention. supra note 82, art.
22(3) (grounds for exceptions to freedom of residence); European Convention,
supra note 82, art. 15(1) (derogation in "time of war or other public emergency");
American Convention, supra note 82, art. 27 (derogation in "time of war, public
danger or other emergency").
168.
European Protocol No. 4, supra note 82, art. 2(3): American
Convention, supra note 82, art. 22(3).
169. European Protocol No. 4, supra note 82, art. 2(4); accord American
Convention, supra note 82, art. 22(4) ("[Diesignated zones" can be restricted for
reasons of "public interest.").
The Banjul Charter contains only one exception, but it's a large one: "Every
individual shall have the right to freedom of movement and residence within the
borders of a State provided he abides by the law." Banjul Charter, supra note 82,
art. 12(1) (emphasis added).
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building's management. 170 Because the freedom of residence
does not guarantee a right to choose any particular place, it
cannot, as a matter of logic, entail a right to stay in any particular
place. The freedom of residence thus fails to secure the most
important aspect of the right to stay-the right to remain exactly
where one is.
The "geographical" strength of the freedom of residence is
open to serious question. The freedom connotes, inter alia, that a
state may not prohibit persons from living within particular areas
inside its borders. 17 1 But what Is the size or nature of those
areas? The answer is crucial because an extrapolated right to
stay depends on it. If the "freedom of residence" means only that
people have the right to live in any region of the country they
wish, then their "right to stay" is only a right to remain within the
region they have chosen, and the government can properly move
them any place within it. If the "freedom of residence" instead
means that people have a "right to live" in any city they wish,
their right to stay is stronger, but still permits forced moves
72
within the metropolitan area.1
Third, geographical questions aside, the argument for
implying a right to stay from the freedom of residence works only

at the margin. A right to choose one's residence is undoubtedly
made chimerical if the state is permitted to overturn the choice at
any time or for any reason.' 7 3 But what if a state waits five years,
or even just two years, before ousting a family? Is the initial
decision still "chimerical" and the state power implicitly denied?
What if state-sponsored removals are limited to three permissible
grounds, or even to six permissible grounds? Is the initial
decision still "chimerical" and the state power implicitly denied?

170. Under the "freedom of residence" in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. "[olne cannot demand to set up a house on other people's
property." Atle Grahl-Madsen, Article 13, In UNIVERSAL DECLARATION, supra note
120, at 203, 209.
171. See Higgins. supra note 14, at 343 (States do not feel entitled to
restrict the movement of nationals, except in highly sensitive military areas.).
172. See Atle Grahl-Madsen. Article 13, inUNIVERSAL DECLARATION, supra
note 120, at 209 (A person may choose whether to live in a city, town, village, or
in the countryside, and may also choose which city, town, village, or district,
without special permission from the government.).

173. See, e.g., Mpandanjila v. Zaire, U.N. Comm. on Human Rights
138/1983, reported in U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex VIII, at 12124 (1986) (internal banishment of President's political opponents a violation of
article 12(1) of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights); Mpaka-Nsusu v. Zaire,
U.N. Comm. on Human Rights 157/1983, reported In U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 40,
Annex VIII, at 142 (1986) (internal banishment of President's political opponents
a violation of article 12(1) of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). Both
cases are discussed in Higgins, supra note 164, at 341-42.
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In short, one can extrapolate from the "freedom of residence" only
174
obvious, minimal limitations on state-sponsored removals.
Stronger, more detailed limitations cannot be derived in this way.
4. Rights to Privacy and Home
The last major international human right protecting a right to
stay is the freedom from arbitrary interference with one's home.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides,
for example, that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and
reputation" and "[elveryone has the right to the protection of the
law against such interference or attacks."'175
Substantially
identical language, or substantially identical protection, appears
17 6
in most other major human rights instruments.
Like most international human rights, this "home right" Is

subject to exceptions 17 7 and can be suspended in time of public

emergency. 178 These features, of course, diminish the right's
effectiveness in securing a right to stay. Still, the "home right" is
especially interesting for two reasons. First, it obliges nations not

only to refrain from interference themselves, but to provide

174. That is, states must not be permitted to move persons in a completely
arbitrary way or at any time they wish.
175. Civ Pol Covenant, supra note 82, art. 17.
176. E.g.. Universal Declaration, supra note 82, art. 12 (substantially
identical language); American Convention, supra note 82, art. 11 (substantially
identical language); European Convention, supra note 82, art. 8 (same); American
Declaration, supra note 82, art. 9 (substantially identical protection: "[Elvery
person has the right to the inviolability of his home.").
177. Nonarbitrary or lawful Interferences would obviously be permitted. See
Civ Pol Covenant, supra note 82, art. 17(1) ("arbitrary or unlawful" Interference
prohibited); Universal Declaration,supra note 82, art. 12 ("arbitrary" Interference);
American Convention, supra note 82, art. 11(2) ("arbitrary or abusive"
interference). The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms contains a familiar list of exceptions:
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as Is in accordance with the law and is necessary in
a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.
European Convention, supra note 82, art. 8(2).
178.
See Civ Pol Covenant, supra note 82, art. 4 (derogation in time of
"public emergency"); European Convention, supra note 82, art. 15(1) (derogation
in "time of war or other public emergency"); American Convention, supra note 82,
art. 27(1) (derogation in "time of war, public danger, of other emergency").
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protection against interference by private persons. 17 9 Second, the
"home right" works as an early warning system for future
dislocations, tripping an alarm at interferences that fall short of
forced physical movement, but that could lead to or encourage
such a movement. A series of ransackings by police officers, for
example, designed to force the residents out of their home or out
of the country, would not necessarily violate the other human
rights discussed in this Article, but would violate the "home
right." Forced movements themselves would seem to violate the
"home right" as well, although it has seldom been used in that or
any other context. 180 Historically, the "home right" has been
understood primarily as a component of a wider "right to privacy,"
not as a bulwark against forced movement. 18 1 Even so, there is
some precedent for invoking the "home right" in cases of forced

movement, 182 and such use may increase in the future.
IV. CONCLUSION

Both domestic and international law are tenacious in their
defense of a right to stay, but the right is easily overlooked.
Because there is little use of the phrases "right to stay" or "right
not to be moved," 18 3 the phenomenon to which these phrases
refer tends to be ignored. But once attention is drawn to the
underlying desire, and once a legal right is named, the right to
stay makes itself manifest in a dozen places. In the United
States, the right to stay can be seen in the strictly limited number
of ways that people can lose their possessory estates; in the ease
with which possessory rights can be extended from owners to
others; in the procedures that must be followed when a loss of a
possessory estate is threatened; in the laws aimed at avoiding
See Civ Pol Covenant, supra note 82, art. 17(2); American Convention,
179.
supra note 82, art. 12(3); European Convention, supra note 82, art. 8(2) (reference
to "public authority" in clause (2) suggesting that protection in clause (1) covers
actions by both public and private persons).
180. See, e.g., ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 137, at 138 (relatively
little case law on "home right" in the European Convention on Human Rights).
181. See Lars Adam Rehof, Article 12, In UNIVERSAL DECLARATION, supra note

120, at 188.
182. See Cyprus v. Turkey, Applications 6780/74 & 6950/75, 4 Eur. H.R.
208-10 (1976) (Eviction of residents in northern part of Cyprus in
Rep. 482,
connection with Turkish invasion of 1974 was a violation of Art. 8 of European
Convention.).
183. For one of the few sustained efforts to garner support for the use of
such a phrase, see Stavropoulou, supra note 8, at 748 (arguing for explicit
recognition of a "right not to be displaced"); see also de Zayas, supra note 8 ("right
to the homeland").
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sudden financial distresses that typically lead to such losses; in
the torts of trespass, assault, battery, and false imprisonment; in
the crimes of assault, battery, burglary, and kidnapping; in family
law obligations of support; and in constitutional prohibitions
against unlawful searches and seizures. 18 4 Internationally, the
right to stay can be seen in the rules restricting the actions of
occupying powers during armed conflict; in the land rights of
indigenous peoples; in the international minimum standard for
the treatment of aliens; and in the international human rights to
private property, the freedom from expulsion, the freedom to
choose one's residence, and the freedom from the arbitrary
interference with one's home.' 8 5 Like the "right of privacy" a
century ago,' 86 the right to stay is one of the great present-day
legal marvels of the day. Largely unobserved because frequently
unnamed, still it rumbles and boils through the law, and once
observed, connects an extraordinary variety of laws not previously
18 7
understood to be related.
U.S. domestic and international law defend the right to stay
in strikingly different ways. In U.S. law, the defense is primarily
founded in property law, with some additional, but clearly
secondary, support coming from tort, criminal, family, and
constitutional law. Internationally, the right to stay is founded on
a series of provisions, no one of which could be said to dominate:
an explicit guarantee of the right, but only good in times of war;
another explicit guarantee, but only good for indigenous peoples;
a less explicit guarantee, only good for aliens; and four
international human rights, good for almost all people all the
time, but which may or may not apply depending on the
circumstances. Which approach is better?
One is tempted to prefer the U.S. approach, and on grounds
other than reflexive provincialism.
First, the form of U.S.
protection--one major body of law, with minor supporting roles
played by others-appears simpler than the international
approach. That appearance, of course, is partly deceiving. It is
true that international lawyers examining a case of forced
movement might find themselves initially researching at least

184.
185.
186.

See supraPart II.
See supra Part III.
See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4

HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).

187. Id. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 64, at 849 (Regarding the right to
privacy, Warren and Brandeis "reviewed a number of cases In which relief had
been afforded on the basis of defamation, Invasion of some property right, or
breach of confidence or an implied contract, and concluded that they were in
reality based upon a broader principle which was entitled to separate

recognition.").
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seven areas of law, and that U.S. lawyers are likely to be

researching only one, but that "one" is extraordinarily complex.
Every student of U.S. property law knows that the singularity of
the source says nothing about the simplicity of the analysis.
Still, the division of the international analysis into several
categories does increase the possibilities for incoherence. United
States property lawyers and judges work self-consciously within a
single area of law, and thus tend to check whether new
developments are congruent or consistent with older practices
throughout the field. l8 8 When there are gaps or anomalies,
corrective action is often taken.' 8 9 In contrast, international
lawyers and treaty-makers who are developing proposals, for
example, on the proper treatment of indigenous peoples, are less
likely to insist that the proposals be congruent or consistent with
all the laws of war. 190 In the international protection of the right
to stay, gaps and anomalies are easy to find. 19 1
One should not, however, make too much of the disarray.
Some of it is unavoidable, some of it is wise, and almost none of it
is of practical concern. The international system faces challenges
of extraordinary variety on a daily basis; a cacophony of voices
requires a multiplicity of responses. The singular U.S. response
of protecting the right to stay with property law works as well as it

188. Property is a thoroughly modem subject of thoroughly antiquated
origins. Probably in no other area of law does one see more, or even as
many, strains of the old in the new.... Property law has, to be sure,
undergone constant change, but-at least in Anglo-American

experience-it has not been revolutionized. Its enduring mix of old and

new, rife with uneasy tensions, reflects more than an institution that has
evolved over centuries and across cultures; it reflects as well two often
accommodating
and
stability
objectives-promoting
conflicting
change-that property systems must serve.
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 43, at xxxiii.
189. A nice, if homely, example is provided by the shift from the "title
theory" to the "lien theory" of mortgages. Once the change is made in a
particular state, courts must work out its ramifications in many different
contexts, seeking consistency with the new theory. The Illinois story is told in
Harms v. Sprague, 473 N.E.2d 930, 933-34 (Ill. 1984).
190. The law of war Is explicitly concerned with border crossing; the law
regarding indigenous people is not. The Indigenous Peoples Convention is
explicitly concerned about compensation for property taken; the law of war is not.
Compare Geneva Convention, supra note 70, art. 49 (discussion, supra, Part HI.A)
with Indigenous Peoples Convention, supra note 80, art. 16 (discussion, supra,
Part III.B).
191. See, e.g., Goebel, supra note 164, at 3-4, 10, 19, 20 (noting differences
in current treatment of displaced and resettled persons); Stavropoulou, supra
note 8, at 724-25, 738-39 (contrasting, Inter alla, war-time and peacetime
protections against displacement; contrasting variable applicability of human
rights norms to forced transfers).
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does because U.S. citizens have relatively clear, and shared, views
on private property in real estate. When those shared views are
missing, as they are in the international system, the effectiveness
of the U.S. response declines precipitously. Given the uneven
status of property law around the world, given the very great
differences in the social, economic, and political circumstances of
nation-states, international law cannot adequately protect the
right to stay with an effort grounded solely in private property.
Instead, it wisely protects the right to stay by drawing on the
concept of personal privacy, the anciently recognized tie between
citizen and homeland, the notion of residential choice, and the
92
humanitarian impulse to minimize the civilian tragedy of war.'
As a result of such a multivariant response, almost any
forced movement of any person from one place to another will
violate international law.19 3
Doctrinal gaps are thus more
theoretical than real.
Furthermore, there appear to be no
instances in which international doctrine regarding the right to
stay is so inconsistent that states are required to act in two
different ways simultaneously, or that individuals are given
contradictory rights. Thus, while there are clearly opportunities
for some doctrinal housekeeping,19 4 the relative need for such
work is a bit doubtful. As in many areas of international law,
those who would seek to improve the right to stay are generally
better off working toward better recognition and enforcement of
the existing rules, rather than the production of more or better
95
rules.'
Nonetheless, if better international doctrine is desired, the
U.S. way of protecting the right to stay suggests a fruitful line of

development. Property law produces a clear and early tripwire for
catching violations of the right to stay. In a property law system,
legal protection is engaged whenever a property line is crossed,' 9 6

192.
See supra Part III.
193.
See Stavropoulou, supra note 8, at 738 ("A great majority of cases of
displacement are highly likely to result in the violation of at least one human

right.").
194. See Goebel, supra note 164; Stavropoulou, supra note 8.
195. Accord Neil H. Afran, Essay, International Human Rights Law In the
Twenty-First Century: Effective Municipal Implementation or Paean to Platitudes, 18
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1756, 1761 (1995) (movement needed to incorporate
international human rights standards in national law and policy); R. Jackli, What
Does the Future Holdfor InternationalHumanitarianLaw?. 9 AusTL. Y.B. INT'L L.
384, 385-86 (plethora of international legal instruments diminishes their value:
work needed to improve respect for existing rules); Richard A. Leach, Comment,
Effective Enforcement of the Law of Nations: A Proposed International Human
Rights Organization, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 705, 706, 727-28 (rules, principles, and
norms are already in place; steps needed to strengthen enforcement).
196. If not privileged, the line-crossing is a trespass. See KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 64, at 70-72.
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whenever a home is entered. Without that line, the next fully
established checkpoint under international law lies at the
19 7
national border, where the freedom from expulsion is engaged.
A great deal of human suffering can be caused, and has been
caused, before any border is reached.19 8 Those interested in
solidifying an international right to stay can usefully promote the
wider and more frequent recognition of property rights in
international practice. For many reasons, this approach has
less pursued, by international
seldom been considered, much
19 9
lawmakers and commentators.
It is also clear that human rights law is the best vehicle for
improving the international protection against forced movements.
"Situational" approaches, illustrated by the law of war, can only
ameliorate problems appertaining to the situation regulated.
"Class" approaches, illustrated by the older law regarding the
treatment of aliens and the newer law regarding indigenous
peoples, can only ameliorate problems appertaining to the subject
classes. International human rights law, because of its universal
applicability, provides the only mode of legal development capable
of protecting the right to stay in a comprehensive and coherent
way. This again points to the wisdom of developing and refining
an international right to property, though it also suggests the
usefulness of developing and refining the "home right," the
international human right to be free from arbitrary or unlawful
interference with one's home.
The U.S. experience teaches the value of an individual right
to property, but also displays the right's weaknesses as a
guarantor of a right to stay. First, interests in property must be
acquired, leading to an uneven protection of the right to stay

whenever there is an uneven distribution of property ownership.

Second, interests in property are vulnerable to commercial loss,
an odd vulnerability for any human right. This suggests, at the

197. See supra Part III.D.2.
198. On the plight of internally displaced persons, see, e.g., Quenod Report,
supra note 9; Roberta Cohen. International Protection for Internally Displaced
Persons, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NExT CENTURY 17-19 (Louis Henkin
& John L. Hargrove, eds., 1994).
199. See, e.g., Quenod Report, supra note 9 (concentrating on better
coordination of United Nations entities); Stavropoulou, supra note 8
(concentrating on adoption of a newly explicated right not to be displaced);
LAWYERS' COMMITTEE, supra note 12 (concentrating on rights of persons after they

have taken flight). Generally speaking, international law regarding the movement
of people has generated a great deal more interest than property rights. Compare
JULIAN R. FRIEDMAN & MARC I. SHERMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS:

AN INTERNATIONAL AND

COMPARATIVE LAW BIBLIOGRAPHY 234-43 (1985) (materials on movement of people;

56 entries) with Id. 256-57 (materials on property; 6 entries).
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international level, that protection of the right to stay be
developed and maintained both inside and outside of property
law. It also suggests the value, at the U.S. level, of working for an
ever wider distribution of home ownership, and for a progressive
reduction in the circumstances under which people are moved
from their homes simply on account of money. Such work will
seem radical only to those unacquainted with the history of the
United States, 20 0 and misguided only to those unacquainted with
the deepest longings of the human heart.

200. It has long been U.S. public policy, through administrations both
Republican and Democratic, to encourage home ownership. See, e.g.. R. ALLEN
HAYS, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT & URBAN HOUSING 89-90 (2d ed. 1995); FEDERAL
HOUSING POLICY AND PROGRAMS: PAST AND PRESENT 39-40 (J. Paul Mitchell ed.,
1985); JOHN C. WEICHER, HOUSING: FEDERAL POLICIES AND PROGRAMS (1980).

Likewise, there is a longstanding tradition of protecting home-owning debtors
from losing their homes on account of that debt. See supra Part II.A.1. In
addition, there is the more recent development of improving the security of
tenants in the continued possession of their leaseholds. See supra Part II.A.3;
Bell, supra note 3. at 483-84 (growing perception that a residential tenant's
expectation of continuity sometimes outweighs landlord's rights).

